Abstract. We study two person nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with risk-sensitive discounted and ergodic cost criteria. Under certain conditions we establish a Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies for the discounted cost criterion and a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies for the ergodic cost criterion. We achieve our results by studying the relevant systems of coupled HJB equations.
1. Introduction. We study nonzero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic differential games on the infinite time horizon. In the literature of stochastic differential games, one usually considers the expectation of the integral of costs [13] , [15] , [25] etc. This is the so called risk-neutral situation where the players (i.e., the decision makers or controllers) ignore the risk. If the players are risk-sensitive (i.e., risk-averse or riskseeking), then the most appropriate cost criterion is the expectation of the exponential of the integral of costs. We refer to [23] for an excellent note on risk-sensitive Nashequilibria. Since the cost criterion is the expectation of the exponential of the integral costs, it is multiplicative as opposed to the additive nature of the cost criterion in the expectation of the integral costs case. Due to this, the analysis of the risk-sensitive case is significantly different from its risk-neutral counterpart. To our knowledge, the risk-sensitive criterion was first introduce by Bellman [5] , see [27] and the reference therein. Though this criterion has been studied extensively for stochastic optimal control problems [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [22] , [24] , the corresponding literature in the context of stochastic differential games is rather limited. Some exceptions are [3] , [4] , [14] . In this paper we address the existence of Nash equilibria for stochastic differential games where the state of the system is governed by controlled diffusion processes. We consider two risk-sensitive cost evaluation criteria: discounted and ergodic. For both criteria, we establish Nash equilibria under certain conditions. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the problem description. The discounted cost criterion is analyzed in Section 3. Under certain additive structural conditions on the drift vector and the cost functions we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies. In Section 4 we study the ergodic case. Under a Lyapunov type stability condition we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2. Problem Description. For the sake of notational simplicity we treat two player game. The N -player game for N ≥ 3 is analogous. Let U i , i = 1, 2, be compact metric spaces and V i = P(U i ), the space of probability measures on U i with Prohorov topology. Letb
be functions satisfying the following:
(A1) (i) The functionsb, σ,r k , k = 1, 2, are bounded, Lipschitz continuous in the first argument uniformly over the second and third arguments. Also the functions b,r k , k = 1, 2, are (jointly) continuous.
(ii) The function a = σσ ⊥ : R d → R d×d is uniformly elliptic, i.e., the infimum of the eigenvalues of a is strictly positive. Here for a matrix say A, A ⊥ denote the transpose of A.
Consider the following controlled diffusion process given by the solution of the stochastic differential equation (s.d.e.) (2.1)
where
2 is a measurable function. Under (A1), the s.d.e. (2.1) has a unique weak solution which is a strong Markov process for a given initial condition X(0) = x; see [ [2] , Theorem 2.2.12, p.45] for details. For the stochastic differential game, the controlled diffusion given by (2.1) has the following interpretation. The ith player controls the state dynamics, i.e., the controlled diffusion given above, through the choice of his strategyv i (t) = v i (t, X(t)), t ≥ 0. By an abuse of notation, the measurable map
is measurable} be the set of all Markov strategies for player i. If v i doesn't have explicit dependence on t, i.e., v i (t, x) = v i (x), x ∈ R d , t ≥ 0, it is said to be a stationary Markov strategy for player i. The set of all stationary Markov strategies for player i is denoted by S i , i = 1, 2. We topologize S i , i = 1, 2, using a metrizable weak* topology on
, where M s (U i ) denotes the space of all signed measures on U i with weak* topology. Since S i is a subset of the unit ball of
, it is compact under the above weak* topology. One also has the following characterization of the topology given by the following convergence criterion:
, p.57] for details. Now we define a class of strategies to be referred to as eventually stationary strategies denoted byŜ i , i = 1, 2. Let Θ > 0. Let
We consider the weak* topology L ∞ ((0, Θ) × M s (U i )), on the spaceŜ i , introduced by Warga [26] for the topology of relaxed controls. Note that with the above topology, S i becomes a compact metrizable space with following convergence criterion:
. The Markov strategies associated withv i ∈Ŝ i , i = 1, 2, is given byv i (θe −αt , X(t)), t ≥ 0, for each θ ∈ (0, Θ) and α > 0, where X(t) is the solution of the s.d.e.
By an abuse of notation, we represent the eventually stationary Markov strategies by elements ofŜ i , though each member inŜ i corresponds to a family of Markov strategies indexed by θ and α. Note that as t → ∞, e −αt → 0. Thus in the long run an element ofŜ i "eventually" becomes an element of S i for a fixed θ. Hence the terminology.
We consider two risk-sensitive cost criteria, discounted cost and ergodic cost criteria which we describe now.
2.1. Discounted cost criterion. Let θ ∈ (0, Θ) be the risk-aversion parameter. In the α-discounted payoff criterion, ith player chooses his strategy v i from the set of all Markov strategies M i to minimize his risk-sensitive cost given by
where α > 0 is the discount parameter, X(t) is the solution of the s.d.e. (2.1)
denote the expectation with respect to the law of the process (2.1) corresponding to the Markov strategy pair (v 1 , v 2 ) with the initial condition X(0) = x.
2.2. Ergodic cost criterion. In this criterion player i chooses his strategy v i ∈ M i so as to minimize his risk-sensitive accumulated cost given by
The definition of Nash equilibrium is analogous. We wish to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium among the class of stationary strategies.
For both cost criteria, we carry out analysis by studying the corresponding system of coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. Note that if one of the players, say player 1, is using a prescribed stationary strategy, then it is a (stochastic) optimal control problem for the other player (player 2) which has been studied in [10] , [11] . The value function of this stochastic optimal control problem is the unique solution of the corresponding HJB equation. Then a stationary/Markov strategy associated with a minimizing selector of the appropriate Hamiltonian of the HJB equation yields an optimal control of the second player. Thus this stationary/Markov strategy is an optimal response of player 2 given that player 1 is employing a prescribed strategy. Therefore for a given pair of stationary/Markov strategies, we obtain a pair of optimal responses of the players via the corresponding HJB equations. Any fixed point of this map gives a Nash equilibrium. This leads us to study a coupled system of HJB equations for each criterion which we describe in forthcoming sections. To this end we first set up the frequently used notations.
Denote sup
space of all bounded, continuous functions, we denote for each B, a Borel subset of
We define the weighted Sobolev spaces W 2,p,λ (R d ), 1 ≤ p < ∞, λ > 0 as follows:
For a Banach space X with norm
with the norm
) with the norm given by
The corresponding weighted Sobolev spaces are defined by
with the norm given by
It is easy to see that the above 'regular' parabolic weighted Sobolev spaces can be isometrically identified with the 'usual' space-time weighted Sobolev spaces
with norm
Also the local Sobolev spaces
The norm · 1,2,p;(t0,T )×BR is defined as
where B R denotes the open ball of radius R with center 0 in R d .
Analysis of Discounted Cost Criterion.
In this section, we consider the discounted cost criterion for the stochastic differential game. We carry out our analysis for the α-discounted cost criterion via the criterion
Since logarithm is an increasing function, therefore any Nash equilibrium for the criterion (2.4) is a Nash equilibrium for the above criterion. The definition of Nash equilibrium is analogous for the above criterion. Letv i ∈Ŝ i , i = 1, 2. Corresponding to the cost criterion (3.1), the value functions are defined by
Now we prove that the above value functions are solutions of the corresponding HJB equations for discounted cost criterion. For a (heuristic) derivation of these HJB equations using multiplicative dynamic programming, we refer to [20] . We first prove the following. 
Proof. From [ [7] , Theorem 3.3, p.235-236], it follows that (3.2) has a unique solution in
. Now using Itô-Dynkin formula to ψ n (θ(t), X(t)), t ≥ 0, where θ(t) = θe −αt and X(t) is the process (2.1) corresponding to the Markov strategy pair (v 1 , v 2 ), v 2 ∈ M 2 with the initial condition X(0) = x, , we obtain
Now by letting n → ∞, we obtain
Hence it follows that
Now by invoking dominated convergence theorem for letting R → ∞ above, we obtain
The existence of such av * 2 (θ, x) is ensured by [6] .
This completes the proof of the first part. The proof of the second part follows by a symmetric argument.
Next we take limit κ → 0 and show that value function satisfies the limiting equation. In particular we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Assume (A1). (i) For eachv
Tκ 0 e −αt r2(X(t),v1(θe −αt ,X(t)),v2(t,X(t)))dt
(ii) Similarly, for eachv 2 ∈Ŝ 2 , the p.d.e.
Proof. We prove (i). The proof of (ii) is analogous. From Lemma 3.1, it follows that (3.2) has a unique solution in
Tκ 0 e −αt r2(X(t),v1(θe −αt ,X(t)),v2(t,X(t)))dt .
From (3.7), it follows that
Using similar arguments as in the proof of [ [11] , Theorem 3.1], it follows that
For λ > 0 fixed, rewrite (3.2) as follows.
is the unique solution to (3.10). Letv 2 (θ, x) be a minimizing selector in (3.10). Then (3.10) can be rewritten as
The r.h.s. of the above p.d.e. is uniformly bounded in κ > 0. Hence by using similar arguments as in [[12] , p.158], it follows that
where the constant K > 0 is independent of κ > 0, θ ∈ (0, Θ). Defineψ κ as follows.ψ
One can see thatψ κ ∈ W 1,2,p ((0, Θ) × B R ) for all p ≥ 2, R > 0. Also from (3.9) and (3.11), it follows that 
is a solution to (3.5). For p ≥ d + 1, using Itô's formula as in the proof of Lemma 3.1, it follows that
e −αt r2(X(t),v1(θe −αt ,X(t)),v2(t,X(t)))dt (:= ψv 1 α,2 (θ, x)).
is the unique solution to (3.5).
To continue our analysis we prove some estimates needed later.
Lemma 3.3. Assume (A1). (i) For
(ii) For each R > 0, andv i ∈Ŝ i , i = 1, 2, we have 
Proof. The proof of (i) follows as in [[11], Theorem 3.1].
Letṽ 2 (θ, x) be a minimizing selector in (3.5). Then (3.5) can be rewritten as
From (i), it follows that r.h.s. above is uniformly bounded in θ ∈ (0, Θ), Hence (ii) follows.
Lemma 3.4. Assume (A1). The mapsv
Proof. Letv 
Now using appropriate integration by parts formulae for the second term on the r.h.s. and the term on the l.h.s above and then using (3.17), it follows that ψ is a solution in the sense of distribution to (3.5). Since ψ(0, x) = 1, it is a solution in 
Using linear structure of F i and the compactness ofŜ i , i = 1, 2, it is easy to see that H(v 1 ,v 2 ) is nonempty, convex and compact subset ofŜ 1 ×Ŝ 2 .
To prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium, we prove the upper semi-continuity (u.s.c.) of the map (
To establish the u.s.c. we need some additive structure on the drift of the state dynamics and the cost function (ADAC) given as follows.
(A2) We assume thatb :
The conditions in (A1)(i) are assumed forb i ,r i1 ,r i2 , i = 1, 2. 
Lemma 3.5. Assume (A1) and (A2). Then the map
Therefore by Banach-Saks theorem any sequence of convex combination of the former converges strongly in L 2 loc (0, Θ)×R d ) to the latter. Hence along a suitable subsequence
(In above we denote the convex combination coming from the Banach-Saks theorem by
itself by an abuse of notation.) Now fixv 1 ∈Ŝ 1 and use analogous arguments above to conclude that (3.20) lim
Hence from (3.19) and (3.20), we obtain
. By a symmetric argument, one can show that forv m 2 ∈ H 2 (v m 1 ) and any limit pointv 2 of {v m 2 }, we havev 2 ∈ H 2 (v 1 ). This proves that the map is u.s.c.
Theorem 3.6. Assume (A1) and (A2). Then there exists an
Proof. From Lemma 3.5 and Fan's fixed point theorem [16] , there exists a fixed
This implies that (ψv * 2 α,1 , ψv * 1 α,2 ) satisfies
Now using the representation of the solutions to the p.d.e.s from Theorem 3.2, it follows that
This proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium which is a pair of eventually stationary Markov strategies.
Analysis of Ergodic Cost Criterion.
In this section, we study the ergodic cost criterion for the risk-sensitive stochastic dynamic games. Since cost criterion is dependent on the limiting behavior of the state dynamics, it is quite natural to assume certain stable behavior of the dynamics. We assume the following Lyapunov type stability condition:
where for
We also assume the following technical assumption.
(A4) (Small cost condition)
Now we establish some properties of the controlled diffusion (2.1) needed later. Set
Note that C 0 is the complement of a compact set in R d .
Lemma 4.1. Assume (A1) and (A3). Let X be the process (2.1) corresponding to (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ M 1 × M 2 . Then for each y ∈ C 0 and r > 0 such that B(y, r) ⊆ C 0 , we have
where τ r y = inf{t ≥ 0|X(t) ∈ B(y, r)}. Proof. Fix x ∈ R d and R > 0 large. Let
Using Itô-Dynkin formula, we obtain
Now by letting R → ∞, using Fatou's lemma, we obtain The following lemma follows by an application of Itô-Dynkin formula applied to e θ t 0 r k (X(s),v1(s,X(s)),v2(s,X(s)))ds W (X(t)), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ R ∧ T and using (A4).
Lemma 4.2. Assume (A1), (A3) and (A4). Let X be the process (2.1) corresponding to
We now establish the following result which plays a crucial role in what follows.
Theorem 4.3. Assume (A1) and (A2). There exists
Moreover, the following estimates holds:
The first part of the proof follows from Theorem 3.6. Using Theorem 3.2 (ii), we have
Now using the envelope theorem, see [21] , we have
where v * 1 is a minimizer for J v1,v * 2,α (θ, x) over v 1 ∈ M 1 . This completes the proof of first estimate. The proof of the second estimate is symmetric. Fix x 0 ∈ C 0 and set 
Proof. Using Itô-Dynkin formula it is easy to see that for each v 1 ∈ M 1 , and r > 0 small enough, we have
The second inequality follows from the fact that θ → ψ
is non-decreasing in θ for each fixed x. Now using Lemma 4.1, we obtain
Now by letting r ↓ 0, we obtain
Hence the first estimate follows. The proof of the second estimate is similar.
Lemma 4.5. Assume (A1), (A3) and (A4). Then we have the followinḡ
Proof. For x ∈ C 0 , using Itô-Dynkin formula, it follows that for each v 1 ∈ M 1 , and r > 0 small enough
The last inequality follows using Lemma 4.1 and the fact that x ∈ C 0 . Now by letting r ↓ 0, the first estimate follows. The proof of the second lower bound follows by a symmetric argument. By closely mimicking the arguments in [11] , it follows that To proceed further we assume that: (A5) There exists β > 1 and an inf compact h :
whereĉ > 0 andĈ is a compact subset of R d . It is not difficult to see that if W is a polynomial in x, then (A3) implies (A5), in particular, if W (x) = xQx ⊥ for some positive definite matrix Q, then (A5) follows from (A3).
Finally we prove the following result. Proof. Let X be the process (2.1) corresponding to (v 1 , v
